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Research into the international agreements that increase cooperation over cybersecurity
challenges is severely lacking. This is a necessary next step for bridging diplomatic challenges
over cybersecurity. This work aspires to be push the bounds of research into these agreements
and offer a tool that future researchers can rely on. For this research I created, and made publicly
available, the International Cybersecurity Cooperation Dataset (ICCD), which contains over 350
international cybersecurity agreements and pertinent metadata. Each agreement is marked per
which subtopics within cybersecurity related agreements it covers. These typologies are:


Discussion and Dialogue



Capacity Building



Research



Activity Limiting



Confidence Building Measures



Defense



Incident Response



Terrorism



Crime

Drawing on ICCD and R for summary statistics and significance tests, as well as some
quantitative insights, this research explores the relationship between different agreements,
organizations, and other possibly related factors. The most significant takeaways from this
research are:

1. Governments view cybersecurity in terms of relative advantages and are hesitant to
engage competitors with agreements over topics like incident response and capacity
building.

2. Authoritarian governments are involved with agreements over controlling or projecting
state power and government authority while democratic governments focus on resilience
and defense.

3. There are two groupings of authoritarian governments, those with high technical
capabilities and those without. Technically capable governments focus on agreements
over terrorism, and they also often end up participating in activity limiting agreements.
Those without are preoccupied with agreements over criminal activity.

4. Discussion and dialogue agreements tend to accompany agreements over additional
topics about one fifth of the time. While policy-makers shouldn’t create a hard rule out of
this statistic, it does possibly strengthen an optimistic hypothesis that dialogue
consistently leads to agreements.

Hopefully this research invigorates researchers’ interest in studying and understanding when
cooperation over cybersecurity is successful or not. Policy-makers will need this knowledge if
they are to achieve their goals in an environment that is rapidly increasing in state actors and
complexity
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race,
economic power, military force, or station of birth. We are creating a world where anyone,
anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced
into silence or conformity. Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and
context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here” (Barlow,
1996). Twenty years ago, John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
basked in governments’ limited reach and the absence of sovereignty in cyberspace, a dynamic
that continues to define the domain. The Internet’s decentralized, international, open, and rapidly
evolving nature (Strickling, Hill, 2017) has made traditional government approaches obsolete in
managing the challenges inherent with cyberspace. Yet, while Barlow was correct that
cyberspace is devoid of matter, it nevertheless relies on physical infrastructure, serves humans
who live in sovereign territories, and depends on law abiding companies to make devices. It is at
these control points that governments stake their claims, and where international cooperation has
a chance of success.
This research aims to comprehensively understand international agreements over cybersecurity.
In order to do this, I created the International Cybersecurity Cooperation Database (ICCD),
which I use to explore what topics governments are working towards cooperating over, and how
they are approaching these challenges. ICCD attempts to include every publicly accessible
international cybersecurity agreement between two or more governments up until 2018. Each
agreement has been marked as to what specific cybersecurity subtopics it pertains to: Discussion
and Dialogue, Research, Confidence Building Measures, Incident Response, Cybercrime,
Capacity Building, Defense, Activity Limiting, and Terrorism. Additionally, ICCD includes
1

authoritarian/democratic (polity), internet penetration rate (IPR), and high technology export data
about the participants in each entry in an attempt to understand some of the influencing factors
surrounding these agreements. Whereas there have been numerous studies on ‘cyber conflict’,
this has not been matched sufficiently with studies of cooperation over those same challenges.
This research aims to change that.
With this cooperation-oriented vision in mind, this research works towards three primary goals:
1. Offer a full picture of cyberspace and relevant diplomatic challenges, and present the
current state of international cooperation over cybersecurity.
2. Identify patterns in existing international cybersecurity agreements that can assist
governments in identifying future opportunities, and offer a tool for future researchers
exploring this topic.
3. Identify areas of cooperation that are lacking and offer explanations.
Governments have a long way to go towards attaining a level of international cooperation that
achieves their cybersecurity goals, yet this isn't for lack of trying. Governments around the world
have turned towards a plethora of multilateral, multistakeholder, and bilateral forums in an effort
to meaningfully engage each other over a diverse set of topics. These efforts have culminated in
a great number of agreements, joint statements, frameworks, declarations, forums, and more. Yet
attention and analysis on these efforts has been lacking, with the predominant focus remaining
on ‘cyber conflicts’ and offensive operations. This report hopes to shift the dialogue towards a
cooperation-oriented emphasis. Of course it is still useful to understand cyber conflicts, but the
reward for understanding what contributes towards a successful agreement offers a more
practical and immediate solution to many nations’ foreign policy cybersecurity challenges. This
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is especially true considering experts’ ambivalence over the efficacy of deterrence techniques in
cyberspace (Borghard, Lonergan, 2018). By scrutinizing previous international cooperation over
cybersecurity, researchers can leverage this knowledge to guide future efforts, which is precisely
what this report sets out to do.
In recent years governments have made a notably more significant effort towards cooperating,
yet cybersecurity issues are expected to become increasingly destabilizing and cyberspace more
conflict ridden (Healey, 2017). Recent cyber operations have experimented with increasingly
destructive goals, like the attempt at not only crippling Saudi Aramco’s production capabilities,
but also at crippling the fail-safe mechanism that prevents an explosive disaster (Groll, 2017).
This loosening of norms, along with the looming influx of additional governments who will soon
have offensive cybersecurity capabilities, makes abundantly clear why cooperation over these
challenges needs to be pursued, and soon. It’s about time that thirty years of cybersecurity
ignorance and shocking ‘wake up calls’ comes to an end (Healey, 2013).
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CHAPTER 2: CYBERSPACE AND RELEVANT DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES
A large factor of what makes cybersecurity so challenging to cooperate over is the uniqueness of
the cyberspace domain, combining aspects from all of the traditionally considered domains along
with new aspects. Its basic functionality and governance structure are so counter intuitive to how
traditional international affairs operates that it often makes traditional strategies and approaches
weak or entirely self-defeating. For anyone looking to forge meaningful cooperation over
cybersecurity, there is a necessary base understanding.
Defining ‘cyberspace’ is a lively debated topic among practitioners and academics, but for the
purposes of this study, I use the following definition:
Anything involved in the collection, handling, movement, sharing, or analysis of data
through partially or fully electronically automated methods.
‘Cyberspace’ resides on physical infrastructure that is set up as a series of recursive webs, a
‘network of networks’. Each network connects to an even larger geographic network. Then,
when very large connections must be made to connect different regions, high bandwidth cables
are run between some of the most top level networks in order to connect them as well. While
avoiding the nuances of transportation infrastructure, looking at cyberspace through the context
of the traditional land domain, its structure can be compared with that of a national interstate. At
its furthest points small local and private roads branch outwards from increasingly larger roads,
with those largest avenues connecting to a network of national highways. Just like roads,
different municipalities manage their portions with different rules and with varying degrees of
maintenance. Also similar to roads, a washout at one point prompts drivers to find alternative
routes to their intended destination. However this analogy becomes less useful as it is applied to
4

the more specific aspects of cyberspace. This description has only been for the ‘physical’
infrastructure the Internet resides on.
There is also a logical layer, which dictates which protocols devices use, or rather - which
languages they speak. The ‘World Wide Web’ is a network of devices that speak the same
language, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Yet, there are other logical networks that run off
different protocols, for example the anonymous The Onion Router (Tor) network. These various
‘logical networks’ can be easily understood by comparing them to a stereotypical dirty college
student’s laundry bin. While there is one physical bin that holds all of the clothes, the student
knows there are really two piles of clothes in the bin at any given moment. While the ‘clean’ and
‘dirty’ piles may get somewhat mixed up within this single laundry bin, they are very
importantly two logically different piles. ‘Cyberspace’ encompasses all networks running on the
Internet’s physical infrastructure, even though some protocols may not have the technical
capability to interact with one another.
Where most readers most likely aren’t interested in an introductory networking lesson, this
information allows for relevant insights. First off, each smaller network doesn’t have to choose
to connect to other networks and participate in the global Internet. On a national level, North
Korea would be an extreme example of this; although the government does currently maintain
two connections itself (Reuters, 2017). Also, drawing lessons from the traditional sea domain
and the ocean, this giant network of networks has no central authority or point of control. Yes,
networks operate within the territory of a sovereign government, but there is no inherent
international jurisdiction mechanism. Data often crosses a multitude of static jurisdictions before
reaching its intended recipient. For both the ocean and the Internet, governments can set their
own rules within the parts they control, but experience real difficulties extending their
5

sovereignty past that point. A relevant example of such rule setting would be China’s Great
Firewall. Within China there is tight surveillance and a control of unfolding dialogues on the
Chinese Internet. However, no one in any other country is directly affected by this, unless of
course, they’re trying to communicate with someone or something in China.
Unique to the Internet is that fact that the more devices that are connected to it, the more value it
gains. The larger it is the more valuable it is. Without this dynamic, many authoritarian
governments might otherwise be content not connecting to the international Internet, only
maintaining a gated national network. However, this dynamic means that citizens want to have
access to more online resources, which are often hosted in foreign countries, and therefore
there’s a demand to allow a certain amount of openness. This mix of a demand for openness
versus governments’ control over certain segments of the Internet produces many different
governmental approaches for managing their Internet infrastructures. Likewise, as countries’
connectivities increase, so do their vulnerabilities to malicious cyber activity (Brantly, 2016).
Interestingly though, this doesn’t necessarily have an equal influence on their offensive
capabilities. North Korea maintains a clear asymmetric advantage in that it maintains competent
offensive capabilities but has a rather small cyberspace attack vector for its enemies to target. On
the opposite end of the spectrum, Estonia’s highly Internet reliant society was the target of one of
the world’s most famous cyber attacks in 2007 called the Bronze Soldier Incident, when Russian
patriotic hackers (enabled, or at least unfettered, by the Russian government) targeted the
country with denial of service operations in anger because the Estonian government decided to
move a famous Soviet war hero statue (Healey, 2013).
The Internet’s internationally connected nature, and most countries’ desires to continue their
participation in an internationally connected Internet, means that countries must either bridge
6

their policy disagreements or learn to accept unwanted activity online. In one more extreme
example, this dynamic can be seen in the U.S.-Chinese disagreements on cyber enabled theft.
While this is a point of extreme tension for both sides (Ashbaugh, 2018), their need to participate
in the Internet overcomes this negative aspect. Similarly, transnational crime benefits
extraordinarily from the Internet. While the League of Arab States may deem gambling illegal
(League of Arab States, 2010), Arab citizens can still relatively easily access gambling websites
hosted in other parts of the world. The Internet enables criminals to commit criminal activity
without being in the same country as their target, therefore not being accountable to that
government’s laws. This happened when Yevgeniy Nikulin stole 117 million LinkedIn user
accounts all the way from Russia. Yevgeniy Nikulin has only been held accountable for his
actions due to a cybercrime agreement between the United States and Czech Republic (Farivar,
2018). Along with many other malign activities, the Internet enables terrorist organizations to
communicate and recruit through their own custom forums and social media, identity theft to be
automated and information sold anonymously, and child exploitation and sex trafficking to be
coordinated across borders. Many of these criminal activities are possible without cyberspace,
but are enhanced by new technologies. Fortunately, this is an area where, at least in theory,
governments agree on a need for cooperation. However, reaching an encompassing international
consensus on what is illegal is politically fraught for everything but the most egregious crimes.
This level of cooperation requires ‘dual criminality’, meaning that to avoid ‘safe havens’
unwanted activity must be punishable in all cooperating nations. Additionally, there’s a need for
‘mutual legal assistance’ (MLA) agreements. Below is a brief excerpt from Pedro Verdelho,
demonstrating how mutual legal assistance works (Verdelho, 2008):
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“In the beginning of 2005, a Norwegian citizen (let’s call him A.T.) attacked a bank in Oslo.
He intended to steal money and he did so effectively. During his action, a police officer was
killed. A.T. ran away and could never be found in Norway. Some days later, police found
and searched his home and computer and discovered that A.T. was the owner of an email
account from a provider in the United Kingdom. International cooperation was required from
British authorities which asked the provider to put this email account under surveillance. One
day, A.T. used his account to send an email message. In the United Kingdom, police asked
the ISP information about the IP address where the communication came from and it was
found that it came from Spain.”
This scenario also highlights another challenge involved with cybercrime, the volatility and
inaccessibility of evidence. Cybercrime, such as the above example, scatters evidence across
borders, making it difficult for an investigative authority to obtain. Additionally, much of this
evidence is often volatile, as many organizations store logs and other pertinent data for only a
specified (often brief) amount of time. If international cooperation were to move at its traditional
slow pace, the evidence would be gone before a case could be made against a criminal. To solve
this, most cybersecurity mutual legal assistance agreements contain a clause for legal
proceedings between cooperating parties about ceasing data immediately upon request and then
holding it for a longer period of time until international mechanisms can catch up to legally
obtain the evidence.
Another area where international connectivity creates a lot of friction is in the spread of
information. Liberal democracies overwhelmingly champion the idea of cybersecurity and
achieving an “open, free, secure” Internet (Australian Government, 2017). This concept is
opposed by Russia and China, particularly over the idea of ‘cybersecurity’, which implies the
8

technical security of devices. While China and Russia acknowledge this concept, they’re more
focused on the idea of ‘information security’ and a national ‘information space’. This has much
less to do with the security of infrastructure and devices, and everything to do with controlling
available information and users’ dialogues online. In 2017 alone, the Russian government’s
media and censorship branch, the Roskomnadzor1, blocked 244 web pages daily, and an Internet
user was attacked or threatened every six days (Meuza, 2018). In Chinese Internet censorship,
the government’s goal is in shaping public discourse and public consciousness, not in catching
every dissident. The goal is to foster an environment where there is no demand for dissenting
information in the first place (Chen, Yang, 2018).
This competition between these ideologies of freedom of speech and government guided speech
and information have had a tangible impact between the competing governments and their
respective private industries. Recently Apple was forced into moving the private keys that secure
their Chinese users’ accounts so that they are stored within China where they can be accessed by
Chinese authorities, effectively surrendering any privacy Chinese citizens might have been
granted by Apple accounts prior (Nellis, Cadell, 2018). Similar demands from the Chinese
government that compromise privacy are common. The United States has been struggling with
Russian efforts to sabotage the dialogue surrounding the 2016 elections (Director of National
Intelligence, 2017). This can almost be considered ironic as Russia’s large fear of losing control
of its domestic dialogue online (Giles, 2013) was precisely what they tried to do in their
operations against the United States.

1

The Federal Service for the supervision of communications and mass media.
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These incompatible ideologies about how the Internet should be tend to stunt progress towards
further international cooperation. Among these ideologies are even more specific state and
regional perspectives. At a conference in Hamburg in 2011, representatives were given a chance
to share their perspectives, and many of these didn’t align terribly well (Institute for Peace
Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2011). Possibly most interesting is
the different states insistence on varying terms and definitions:



United States
International laws and norms should be solidified for cyberspace through the OSCE, G8,
or OECD. This viewpoint emphasizes the fact that offline laws apply online, especially
when it pertains to human rights. Additionally there’s a strong belief in the efficacy of
multistakeholder approaches. This viewpoint stresses the individual, as well as the
interests of private firms, in playing a major influencing role in making decisions.



Russia
The Internet is dominated by US owned technology giants like Microsoft, Cisco, Apple,
Amazon, etc., leading to a ‘digital disparity’2 between participants in the Internet. These
companies, which promote U.S. values and are ultimately responsible to the U.S.
government, unfairly impose their will on the Internet. States should have full
sovereignty over their ‘information space’ including “the state of its security and the data
contained”. By referencing the data contained, this means content and censorship if
necessary.

2

Note that this is not a reference to the ITU’s ‘digital disparity’ term.
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China
Governments need to maintain a leading role in cyberspace, and the Chinese government
is committed to “strengthening information and cybersecurity from new angles”. Due to
the Internet’s connectedness, it is in no one’s interest to use this space as a battlefield.
“China does not see itself as one of the “cyber-powers” but rather as a major information
and communication technology (ICT) user, who is facing severe challenges in
cyberspace”.

These three statements alone are illustrative of the rather complicated and frustrating situation
these nations see themselves in. Both Russia and China assert their concept of needing to secure
an ‘information space’, which is contradictory to the US’s (and Europe’s) push for policies that
privilege the individual over the state. The US’s calls for norms were met with resistance and
frustration over the sole US stewardship of Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and
the preeminence of American technology companies. This sole stewardship was later transferred
to a multilateral governance structure in 2016. Russia’s frustration with the lack of diversity in
technology companies speaks to a broader supply chain security concern. Russia and China both
feel a need to produce their own devices and software so as to not have to source these from a
country they have a competitive relationship with. While not listed here, in that same document
France heavily emphasizes the idea that cyber diplomacy should be multistakeholder, which is
exactly inverse of the Chinese perspective that governments need to maintain a leading role in
cyberspace. Just from these brief statements, it’s easy to see why progress is so difficult on a
global scale. In one definitional example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
only officially adopted a working definition of cybersecurity in 2008 (ITU, 2010). The ITU’s
focus on definitions shouldn’t be interpreted as bad. It demonstrates that challenges are rampant
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even down to the most basic language involved in unfolding diplomatic efforts over
cybersecurity.
Sovereignty and governance are a strong point of contention (DeNardis, 2014), and this debate
directly affects international cooperation over cybersecurity issues. As Laura DeNardis
humorously explains, “protocols are politics by other means”, with political impacts. Protocols
are agreed upon standards of operation that individuals, companies, and governments agree to
use. In a non-technical example, a common protocol is to say “hello” and “goodbye” during a
phone call to avoid confusion, this same idea holds true to technical protocols. There is no law
that two computers must use the same protocols. However if they don’t, they lose the ability to
communicate as they then can’t understand each other, diminishing their value.
Protocols, and other standards in cyberspace, are mostly dictated by technocratic NGOs and
multi-governmental organizations (MGOs); which is a significant departure from historical
international-issues, because it marginalizes the role of most governments. The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a lead NGO in cyberspace which is run completely by
volunteers. While there is no recognized authority on establishing technical protocols, the IETF
is perhaps the closest thing to one, and these protocols often have strong policy impacts.
While seemingly apolitical, the fact that the IETF is run by volunteers introduces political
challenges. Often, companies like IBM and other tech giants will sponsor representatives to work
on ongoing projects through the IETF, giving them, and the more technological advanced
countries these companies come from, a larger say in these politically critical standards. This
multi-stakeholder consensus approach diminishes the ultimate authority of participating
governments. Both of these aspects frustrate the Chinese and Russian governments. This
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structure tends to keep developing countries out of the process, and bars anyone who can’t afford
to fly around the world to all of the needed international conferences from contributing to the
IETF. This barrier has been something Brazil has previously been very vocal on within the
Organization of American States (REMJA, 2015), advocating for figuring out a structure which
doesn’t disadvantage potential participants with less resources.
The Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was transferred from US
stewardship to a multi-stakeholder stewardship in 2016. It serves as the authority for top level
domains (ex: .com, .edu., .uk, .cn, etc…) and other Internet backbone nomenclatures. Names and
numbers online are of specific interest, because while the Internet is a diffuse and decentralized
structure, there absolutely must be agreement on the individual assignment of names and
numbers. If there are duplicates, the network can’t function properly.
Such lack of governmental control, and existing competition for increased power in Internet
governance, makes cooperation over many cybersecurity issues more difficult. It means that
nothing can be enforced throughout the entire Internet unless there is an international consensus
or a pertinent non-governmental organization such as ICANN makes the decision, a process
which often ignores the requests of certain governments and communities.
The United Nations International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has also become a global
leader in making decisions. As a branch of the UN, they are arguably the most equitable in
giving each government a say. The ITU is mostly used as a forum for implementing technical
standards across countries, increasing global penetration rates, and for convening governments to
find areas of increased cooperation or for joint research. In one example they helped Arab
countries set and meet better cybersecurity standards for themselves (ITU, 2017). However, the
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ITU’s international nature forces it to avoid contentious cybersecurity topics, which it often
defines as “questions of cybercrime, national defense and security, and legal or policy issues”
(ITU, 2010).
Also crucially important is the immense clout that the private sector holds in cyberspace and
regarding cybersecurity, and more specifically the clout of U.S. companies. Whereas other
countries have their own competencies as well and are starting to challenge this, notably China
and their hardware, U.S. private sector influence is still very strong. Cyberspace is possibly the
only domain in which sovereign governments are ambitious to enforce their jurisdiction but loath
to provide defense for their citizens or hold a strict monopoly on power. While governments
defend their own governmental assets, they leave it up to private entities to defend themselves,
only involving themselves when a severe case warranting their attention arises. This stems from
the impracticality of governments having the resources to amply defend the overwhelming
number of private networks out there. Addressing this, public-private partnerships have had
some success. These organizations facilitate meetings and events for information and best
practice sharing between governments and the private sector. Some rather successful examples
have been the United State’s Infragard and the European Union’s ‘Public-Private Partnership’
(sometimes referred to as P3). Within the United States some policy makers dislike the idea of
being responsible for defense of private networks in certain instances, and there has been
discussion of ceding that authority to the private sector.
‘Active cyber defense’ measures are a spectrum of activities that span everything from
information gathering on an attacker to actually disrupting their computer systems all together
(Hoffman, Levite, 2017). The United States has released documentation preliminarily exploring
‘active cyber defense’ measures, commonly known as ‘attacking back’ (Chesney, 2017). This
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would empower private companies to take things into their own hands and punch back.
However, removing the government’s monopoly on initiating offensive operations has drawn a
lot of criticism. Many are skeptical about the competence of the private sector to be able to do
this, and about the consequences of the common yet legally complicated scenario where the
attacker is in a different country, meaning that a counter operation from a private source might
break another nation’s laws.
Because cyberspace is a domain constructed by humans, the companies that produce the devices
it was constructed with have a certain amount of clout. The fact of the matter is that it’s hard for
governments to make any meaningful progress over cybersecurity topics without engaging large
technology firms. Say for example, governments are looking to alter encryption standards.
Without having RSA3 (a dominant encryption company) and other large technology companies
in the discussion, it’s hard to make any progress beyond statements and recommendations. Yet
governments have other levers to pull. A company’s nationality grants its respective government
a certain amount of power. In this specific example with RSA, the U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) gave RSA encryption tools to incorporate into their products, supposedly with the
veiled (or not disclosed but explicitly agreed) intent that it would allow them to more easily
crack RSA’s encryption (Chabrow, 2014). Yet, no matter how governments chose to engage
private companies, it remains clear that private companies’ cooperation is needed for
governments to reach goals.
This decentralized, overlapping, and murky governance of the global Internet makes
implementing cooperative agreements over cyberspace a particular challenge. Bilateral

3

RSA is named after the encryption standard ‘RSA’, which is named after its creators Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman, the company’s name is the abbreviation ‘RSA’ and not the spelt out version of the standard.
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agreements often only work at addressing specific concerns of interactions between the two
negotiating governments. Multilateral international agreements are often hard to get a final
consensus on, and even when a consensus is reached, seeing to it that the terms of an agreement
are properly implemented throughout the entirety of a country’s highly decentralized
cybersecurity organizations is daunting. Regional organizations seem to be the preferred option
that balances these challenges, yet even then they are often non-binding or minimum in their
requirements. It is hard to enforce agreements among such decentralized national and
international structures.
While there are already huge challenges over topics like cybercrime, competing perspectives,
and Internet governance things are about to get much more complicated. As more and more
governments work to develop their offensive capabilities, it’s expected that there will be a sharp
increase in the number of actors in cyberspace. Unlike other domains, less talented actors are
more dangerous, as they don’t have the resources (and in some cases desire) to run precise
operations. This year Lebanon ran a rather broad spyware operation targeting cell phones looking
to capture video data (Reuters, 2018). Ethiopia also ran an espionage campaign against Ethiopian
dissidents in the US and UK (Marczak, Alexander, McKune, Scott-Railton, Ron Deibert, 2017).
This influx of offensively capable states has the possibility to significantly weaken international
stability. However, there is evidence to suggest that states have shown a certain level of restraint
in cyberspace, and that possibly this increase of offensively capable states may not be as
destabilizing as some might assume. Recent research by Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness
has shown that governments, without the explicit deterrence of others, choose to restrain
themselves from using information and communications technolgies (ICTs) offensively in the
frivolous way many previously expected (Valeriano, Maness, 2015). Similarly, building on
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previous research (Axelrod, Iliev, 2014), Brent Maheux explains that when the matter at hand is
of a ‘Cyberwarfare’ or ‘Political’ natures, an attacker resorts to using malware only when the
stakes are high and of a clear ‘Cyberwarfare’ intention (Maheux, 2014). As examples he offers
the highly sophisticated U.S./Israeli Stuxnet virus that targeted the hardware at the Iranian
Natanz nuclear facility in 2010 and the Flame spyware that spread across the Middle East is
2012. This is significant in that there are a many circumstances where a possible attacker decides
against an attack. However this restraint is considered by some experts to be merely wishful
thinking, or ephemeral as more governments come into play.
Many possible reasons could be causing this restraint, and most likely it is a combination of
reasons. One possible influence is the fear of ‘blowback’. Blowback is the idea that once an
attack leveraging a new vulnerability is used, the government that used it immediately loses
control of it. This might result in other governments copying this attack and finding the same
vulnerabilities in the original attacker, and attacking back using the same methods. Whether or
not this fear truly influences governments’ decisions, current evidence suggests it is a rational
fear. Leyla Bilge and Tudor Dumitras demonstrated that once a vulnerability is disclosed, “the
number of malware variants exploiting them increases 183–85,000 times and the number of
attacks increases 2–100,000 times” (Bilge, Dumitras, 2012). Additionally, these numbers suggest
that an attack that uses a new vulnerability very well might cause collateral damage. This could
mean that other organizations in different industries and countries with the same vulnerability
may be harmed, and the original attacking country might be to blame for not properly
considering the collateral damage of their actions (Schmitt, 2017).
This idea, the idea that governments restrain themselves due to a bundle of various risk factors,
seems well demonstrated in historical instances. However, it is consistently challenged by
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indiscriminate operations such as North Korea’s WannaCry ransomware and the Russian
NotPetya malware that the U.S. executive branch deemed the ‘biggest cyber attack in history’.
Nevertheless, there is still a compelling case to be made that governments refrain from using
cyber attacks even when they would accompany kinetic violence because of fear of the
repercussions. Jason Healey explains that U.S. forces in Libya refrained entirely or partially from
deploying cyber means along with their kinetic actions (Healey, 2013). Overall, world leaders
might be nervous to break the existing norms against practicing ‘cyber restraint’. Richard Clarke
explains that:
“the Bush Administration was apparently unwilling to destroy Saddam Hussein’s
financial assets by cracking into the networks of banks in Iraq and other countries. The
capability to do so existed, but government lawyers feared that raiding bank accounts
would be seen by other nations as a violation of international law, and viewed as a
precedent. The counsels also feared unintended consequences if the U.S. cyber bank
robberies hit the wrong accounts or took out entire financial institutions.” (Clarke, 2011)
The idea of risk in cyberspace is poorly defined and elusive. Yet while it is hard to fully
understand and grasp, ‘risk’ in cyberspace is clearly an overwhelming influence on governments
and a critically important consideration. Governments with new offensive capabilities may or
may not demonstrate this same level of restraint, but many other governments would rather not
wait and find out. There has been a vigorous revival of dialogue around the matter of ‘confidence
building measures’ (CBMs), which famously contributed towards ratcheting down Cold War
tensions that might have otherwise had nuclear consequences (Helsinki Final Act, 1975).
However the environment in which CBMs are being negotiated is notably different from
previously famous confidence and trust building gestures and agreements. Agreements such as
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the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Prevention of Incidents In and Over High Seas Agreement, and
Limited Nuclear Test Ban were all negotiated in a bipolar NATO versus Warsaw Pact
environment, strikingly different from today’s multi-polar world. Many post Cold War
Agreements, like the Open Skies Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, have asserted a
multi-polar emphasis. These were all treaties. Confience and trust efforts as they currently relate
to cyberspace are not treaties at all. Many of them are merely frameworks that governments may
use as a tool, and the strongest of them are non-binding voluntary norms such as refraining from
targeting computer emergency response teams and not allowing illegal activity to operate out of
a government’s sovereign territory when they have the ability to stop it.
The Cold War produced extensive literature focused on CBM theory and how to best contribute
towards CBMs. This work included Osgood’s Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction
(GRIT) Theory (Goldstein, Freeman, 1990) calling for unilateral benign actions without need of
reciprocation from an adversary, or Axelrod’s ‘tit-for-tat’ approach of simply mimicking an
adversary’s moves in ratcheting up or down hostilities (Axelrod, 1981). No similar theory has
been produced on CBMs regarding cybersecurity. These bipolar focused theories aren’t tested
for multilateral efforts, and considering all of the challenges involved in international
cooperation over cybersecurity, it’s easy to understand why reaching meaningful CBMs is a
daunting task.
With all of these diplomatic challenges, obtaining a better understanding of what contributes
towards implementing a successful cybersecurity cooperative activity is both timely and
necessary to ensure future progress.
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CHAPTER 3: CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATONAL COOPERATION
The current state of international cooperation over cybersecurity is, at best, frail. However, these
prevailing agreements are the culmination of particularly burdensome work on behalf of those
championing such efforts, and provide a useful groundwork for continued cooperation.
This slow pace is no surprise as norm building has always been a slow and repetitive process.
Establishing a collective expectation for proper behavior (Finnemore, 2018) takes time and
refinement. Likewise, policy has traditionally lagged behind technology. Considering the
compounding influences of rapidly evolving technologies and gruelingly slow norm building
processes, it’s impressive that agreements have made it as far as they have.
Since 2003 the United Nations General Assembly has maintained a Governmental Group of
Experts (GGE) (UN, 2003) who have been devoted to research into “Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”. Over the years this multinational
group has explored viewpoints and concerns from UN members, all the while producing the
occasional report. The most prominent of these was the 2013 report, which many policy makers
viewed as the first truly global assertion that international laws apply in cyberspace. Equally as
important, this agreements was followed by a 2015 report (UN, 2015) which got all members to
agree to a set of ‘voluntary non-binding norms’. The achievements of these two documents are
seen by many as the most comprehensive international agreements over cybersecurity to date,
specifically citing the voluntary-norms that were established:


States shouldn’t allow their territory to be used for ‘internationally wrongful acts’



States must not use proxies to commit ‘internationally wrongful acts’
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States should not conduct or support activity to harm authorized emergency response
teams



A State should not conduct or knowingly support activity contrary to its obligations under
international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure (‘International Law’
referring to numerous prior G7/G8, G20, and UN agreements)

The degree to which these norms have been followed seems rather pessimistic. Russia has been
caught red-handed supporting their well known Cozy Bears proxy group (Reuters, 2018) and
Iran has been exposed for maintaining a strong relationship with criminal organizations it
sometimes calls on to do favors for the state (Anderson, Sadjadpour, 2017). North Korea’s
WannaCry ransomware was blatantly indiscriminate in 2017, crippling some hospital systems
(critical infrastructure) in the UK. Further still, ‘international law’ is a tenuous concept in
cyberspace, which is most clearly defined by the Tallinn Manual that is not even officially
ratified by any government (Schmitt, Vihul, 2013). The concept of international law in
cyberspace is highly contentious. Following their 2015 report, the UN GGE continued its work
towards further progress, yet it was unable to reach a consensus and offer a report in 2017 due to
a disagreement over a clause that asserted that international law applies in cyberspace. The
debate over the applicability of international law in cyberspace remains because some
governments, Cuba among them, want the ability to use asymmetric cyber capabilities without
dealing with the consequences of their actions being considered an armed attack (Sukumar,
2017). Likewise, governments like Russia and China are hesitant to adopt international laws that
would qualify cyber operations as attacks because that would mean victims might have a legal
right to respond, which is counter to many Western countries that advocate for this because of
this very reason.
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While much of the hype around cybersecurity tends to gravitate towards complex state backed
operations, the bulk of malicious activity online is in fact cybercrime. The Council of Europe’s
2001 Budapest Convention, commonly known as the Convention on Cybercrime, is perhaps the
most successful international agreement over this challenge. The convention is open to anyone
and acts as a joint mutual legal assistance and extradition agreement between members. The
agreement targets blatant criminal activity that every country can agree to as detrimental. It aims
"to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime,
especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation" (Council
of Europe, 2001). The agreement covers everything from minimum sentencing to data retention
and procedural law. The Convention on Cybercrime has been a relative success, yet many
countries haven’t signed it, limiting its authority. Russia and China haven’t signed the document,
and many nations from other regions haven’t ratified the document yet. The Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted a similar document, but it doesn’t
serve as an extradition treaty, requiring every member to forge such an agreement with every
other participating member if there is any chance of it being useful, which hasn’t happened so far
(Orji, 2015).
Less ambitious yet more uniformly subscribed to has been the (former) G8’s 24/7 Contact
Network. This open agreement merely requires participating states to appoint a specific
department within the government to act as the authority on cybersecurity which foreign
governments can contact. This department is then charged with running a permanent office that
can accept communications for clarifying communications or increasing cooperation (G8, 1997).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also become an important
player. The unique history of the OSCE in facilitating confidence building measures sets them
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apart as possibly qualified to facilitate this once again, but this time with respect to
cybersecurity. In 2013 the OSCE released a set of original transparency measures members could
pursue. This was bolstered further in 2016 by the release of sixteen cyber confidence building
measures (CBMs) that countries could consider (OSCE, 2016). At the moment, while these
CBMs are useful suggestions, there has been little initiative by any member to see them actually
implemented. In general, governments have leaned more towards the previously mentioned nonbinding voluntary norms as opposed to any more serious CBMs.
The Coordinating Center Computer Emergency Response Team (CC-CERT) was originally a US
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funded incident response organization. However
as the Internet expanded, it also expanded to become the coordinating authority for over two
hundred CERTs around the world. These CERTs focus on acting as first responders to technical
incidents, like when the City of Atlanta’s public resources were held hostage by ransomware
(Romo, 2018). Additionally, most CERTs participate in the Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST network), a cooperative platform for emergency incident teams around
the world. Above all else, CERTs retain their autonomy, often sharing similar organizational
structures but coming from vastly different environments and maintaining what can sometimes
be a rather loose communication network. For example, while the US-CERT has been granted
national authority for its activities, many other CERTs have merely assumed such a role in their
respective countries and operate in a sort of legal vacuum (Choucri, Madnick, Ferwerda, 2014).
While CERTs or the FIRST network don’t match the definition of an agreement for ICCD,
they’re important to mention as they fill what would otherwise be a large gap in needed
international cooperation. CERTs cooperate over non-politically contentious technical and
procedural matters such as sharing vulnerability information about common products. The
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FIRST network is a multistakeholder organization, consisting of teams from most nations as well
as regional and market specific teams (Amazon SIRT, MSCERT, Huawei PSIRT, etc..). A
corporation or special interest group often funds the CERT which focuses on it, such as Amazon
funding the Amazon SIRT or the special interest U.S. Industrial Control Systems CERT.
Worth mentioning are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cyber defense bloc and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization1 (SCO) information security bloc. While it wouldn’t be
fully accurate to describe them as competitors, it’s clear that they disagree on even the most
basic of definitions. Beliefs and ideologies of individual liberties versus state rights often clash in
international forums like the UN, but are areas of agreement among members of NATO and the
SCO.
NATO declared at their 2014 Wales Summit that a cyber attack could be as harmful as a physical
attack, and therefore declared its right to consider a cyber attack as triggering its Article 5 mutual
defense clause, warranting an armed response (NATO, 2014). NATO has avoided defining this
any more specifically, leaning toward a ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy that allows them to take
possibly qualifying incidents on a case by case basis. Taking their stance a step further, NATO
declared cyberspace an operational domain at their 2016 Warsaw summit, asserting it will work
to maintain “freedom of action and decision” in cyberspace (NATO, 2016). Beyond these
agreements, most NATO members participate in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center
Of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), which was established in Tallinn, Estonia, following the
denial of service attack that targeted Estonia in 2007. Through this organization, a group of
lawyers produced the acclaimed Tallinn Manual 2.0 that aims to lay out what the international
law of cyberwarfare should be, although this work hasn’t been officially endorsed by any
governments (NATO CCD COE, 2013). The NATO CCD COE’s mandate has been recently
24

expanded to include training and education (NATO, CCD COE, 2018), Japan has been accepted
as a member as well.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization4 (SCO) is another organization which member
governments have used to pursue their cybersecurity goals through. In 2008 the SCO released
the ‘Agreement among the Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member
States on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring International Information Security’. This
document emphasized cooperation over ensuring their concept of information security,
specifically listing the “dissemination of information harmful to social and political, social and
economic systems” as a perceived prioritized threat (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009).
The definition of ‘harmful’ is dubiously broad here allowing states to subjectively deem content
‘harmful’ when in reality it is merely dissenting. SCO members have repeatedly looked to assert
an ‘international code of conduct’ through the UN. They introduced the idea once in 2011 and
then again in 2015. While many countries can consistently agree on working towards defining
‘responsible state behavior’ in cyberspace, the SCO members’ proposal was rather one sided. It
looked to reaffirm the UN’s commitment to state sovereignty, therefore legitimizing censorship
and freedom of expression abuses in cyberspace, and denying other countries the ability to take
action against such activities. Furthermore, it tried to emphasize a multilateral Internet
governance system, based only on governments, which ran opposite to many liberal
democracies’ pushes for a multistakeholder system (NATO CCD COE, 2015).

4

China, Kazakhastan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were SCO members when most of the
agreements pertinent to this research were agreed upon. India and Pakistan have now since joined as well.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Before I can identify patterns in existing agreements, and areas and types of agreements that are
lacking, I need to explain what process led to these conclusions and why certain methodological
decisions were made. This section describes how data was collected and turned into usable
information. Anyone who replicates this research through repeating these processes and
decisions should arrive at the same results. Additionally, just as with any study, there are a few
biases discussed that future researchers may hopefully be able to eliminate or mitigate more
effectively.
International Cybersecurity Cooperation Dataset (ICCD)
This paper is the result of a preliminary analysis of the International Cybersecurity Cooperation
Dataset (ICCD). ICCD contains over 350 entries. It is a best effort attempt at cataloging all
international cybersecurity agreements between governments (‘agreements’ are defined later in
this section). ICCD contains metadata about each agreement, and marks each entry so that they
can be sorted by which subtopic within cybersecurity each pertains to. These subtopics are
referred to as ‘typologies’. ICCD also includes additional data on ‘related variables’, describing
the governments involved in each agreement, to illustrate a fuller picture.

ICCD is free for use under a Creative Commons By Attribution copyright at:
http://keepingpacewithcyberspace.com/ICCD
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Sources
This dataset sourced a limited number of documents from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Cyber Norms Index and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence (NATO CCDCOE) INCYDER Dataset. Yet, these datasets only aim to provide the
most signifigant documents within their respective scopes, as opposed to a comprehensive
approach. Also, both of these datasets use their own typologies and are missing categories I
thought important. Given these realities, the main source of dataset entries are primary
documents and sources that were found using a Google search. A Google search was conducted
for every existing country using the key words: “cybersecurity” and “agreement”. Additional
tailored online searches were conducted to find documents that were referenced in previously
collected documents or sources.

Data
Each source was scrutinized and then entered into ICCD along with the typologies it pertained
to, related correlating variables, and the appropriate metadata. ICCD looks to enable research and
analysis with a focus on existing international cybersecurity agreements. This ultimately led to
the decision to construct the dataset with one entry per agreement. Some alternatives to this were
constructing the dataset by country or organization. However to do so by country would not only
result in over 10,000 entries, it would also only be useful for countries which have pursued
agreements often enough to generate enough data to draw conclusions from. Similarly,
organizing the dataset by organization would have faced the same challenges, and made
comparisons between bilateral and multilateral/multistakeholder agreement difficult. For these
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reasons, and keeping true to the focus of the dataset being on agreements and activities, not
countries, the dataset was constructed by agreements.

ICCD can be thought of as two separate datasets (divided into separate sheets), one for bilateral
and one for multilateral/multistakeholder agreements. This is because the two types of
agreements benefit from being compared with different types of influencing data. For example,
the range in polity5 between the two participating countries when considering bilateral
agreements is revealing, while doing the same for agreements brokered through organizations as
broad as the United Nations is rather useless because all types of political systems are
represented.
For each entry into ICCD, the following data is listed:


Title - The title of the source. Sometimes these titles are altered slightly upon entry into the
database for readability, however the essence of the title is always respected.



Date - This is the beginning date of the cooperative activity or agreement. The date of
ratification is used when multiple dates are supplied.



Organization - When applicable, this denotes what international organization this agreement
was brokered in.



Description - Each entry was read in entirety and a brief qualitative description was
supplied. In instances when a larger document covered multiple topics, the description and
research efforts only focus on those parts that are pertinent to cybersecurity. Text was quoted

5

The Center for Systemic Peace graciously gave their explicit written consent (Appendix B) to allow some of their
polity data to be included in ICCD.
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in instances where information was presented in a concise enough way to quote within the
dataset.


Typology - Every entry was assigned typologies pertaining to the agreements, this was often
multiple typologies. These typologies were:
o Discussion and Dialogue - This activity requires the least commitment from parties and
just involves agreeing on future discussion and dialogue to exchange viewpoints and
opinions. This includes forums, conferences, dialogues, high level meetings, agreements
on future meetings for further discussion, and in many cases working groups.
o Research - This activity pertains to research into social science information surrounding
cybersecurity as well as technical research (often agreements are not terribly articulate on
clarifying this). This includes surveying parties, establishing expert groups, and
academic/multistakeholder studies.
o Confidence Building Measures - These measures include information sharing, voluntary
norms, points of contact and hotlines, and some capacity building efforts when the clear
purpose is to establish confidence and trust to prevent destabilizing activities from
harming relations. To avoid definitional challenges, this research does not require a
certain amount of competitiveness or an adversarial relationship to be present for
something to be considered a confidence building measure. The decision to define this
typology so broadly was due to known high profile cases of close allies having distrust in
one another, for instance as a results of the post-Snowden revelations when U.S.
operators were revealed to have aggressively pursued targets, even when they were on
European networks, without notifying these allies.
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o Incident Response - This pertains to coordinating across government agencies how to
best handle incidents. While CERTs and CSIRTs clearly fill this role, this study focuses
specifically on governments and their agreements involving this. These agreements often
blur the lines between governments and their CERTs. In some instances governments
agree to enhance their CERTs’ cooperation with one another. Considering government
involvements in these agreements, these instances were included under this category.
o Cybercrime - While criminal activity is defined differently across the globe, this
category applies to any agreement to manage and deal with activity that is deemed illegal
by a given government. This activity also includes dealing with victims of criminal
activity (such as child protection agreements).
o Capacity Building - This activity pertains to efforts to increase offensive and defensive
capabilities through training, cooperation, or providing equipment. This often deals with
protecting critical infrastructure, but can also deal with offensive capabilities. Notably,
countries often agree to build capacity in 3rd countries, yet it is often unclear if they
reference this in a security or development context. When a clear development context
(absent of any cybersecurity context) can be discerned, the potential entry is excluded.
o Activity Limiting - This broad title references when governments agree to refrain from
certain activities. Most commonly this is seen in agreeing to refrain from theft “for
commercial gain”. However agreeing not to target CERTs and CSIRTs, as well as other
activity limiting, is sometimes mentioned.
o Defense - This looks at mutual defense, or cooperative defensive agreements. While
capacity building may sometimes improve a country’s defensive posture, these activities
look at mutually pursuing strong cooperative defense activities.

30

o Terrorism - This research does not define terrorism. However when countries use terms
such as ‘extremism’ or ‘terrorism’, those agreements qualify for this typology.


Link - A link is provided to every source, which is usually a primary document or
government site. All of these links were ‘live’ at the construction of ICCD, although it is
possible that some may become ‘dead’ in the future.



Bi / Multi - This marks if the cooperative activity was bilateral, marked by a ’B’, or
multilateral/multistakeholder, ‘M’.



Countries - This lists the countries involved in alphabetical order.



Notes - When there was a complication, additional source, or other need for commentary, a
note is provided.

Additionally, correlating variables were added to each entry, pulling from different datasets from
the same year as the initial ICCD entry. The variables aim to provide related pertinent data that
may offer a wider perspective regarding these cooperative activities. These variables are
described below, along with their source:


Variable: Polity
Source: Center for Systemic Peace
Dataset: Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2016
Link: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
Description: ‘Polity’ is a quantitative value derived from quantifying a country’s
‘democracy’ score and ‘authoritarian’ score, and subtracting the latter from the former.
This provides an idea of what type of government is in place. It should be noted that the
underlying theory that led to the creation of ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democracy’ scores
proposed that these are not opposites and that they can coexist. Polity is a popular tool
31

within the research community and still provides an insight into the type of government
in place.


Variable: Internet Penetration Rate
Source: World Bank
Dataset: Internet World Stats
Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS
Description: ‘Internet Penetration Rate’ (IPR) is a measure of what percentage of a
country is able to access the Internet. It is often used to facilitate a discussion on how
much Internet infrastructure a country has. While useful, it should be noted that ‘having
access’ to the Internet is entirely different from being able to use it. A variety of
challenges like monetary costs, language barriers, and technical fluency often prevent
those who ‘have access’ from using the Internet. In fact, half of the world isn’t even
connected to the Internet, and of the ‘connected’ half many are unable to use it. That
being said, rolling out the infrastructure is a mandatory first step in connecting people to
the Internet and is therefore a useful measure (ITU, 2018).



Variable: High Technology Export Percentage
Source: World Bank
Dataset: High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS?view=chart
Description: This variable tracks what percentage of exports are classified as being ‘high
technology’. For the purposes of ICCD, it is used as a proxy variable for the technical
capability of a country. This is not a perfect measure by any means, as there is often a
disconnect between what a country is exporting and what it is capable of. However it is
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the best fit given the alternative proxy variables. Including this variable is important
because there is often a disconnect between how much Internet infrastructure a country
has and how technically capable it is, especially with less developed and developing
countries.

Restricting Research Scope
International agreements over cyberspace and cybersecurity challenges represent a broad and
blurry spectrum. These activities range from: international multistakeholder discussion forums,
expert groups, voluntary norms, joint statements, explicit agreements, and many other types.
While explicit agreements and signed documents clearly belong in this dataset, defining a cut-off
for ‘loose form’ cooperative activities is much more challenging. Most difficult to differentiate
are forums, conferences, and dialogues. Without a set scope, this dataset would quickly become a
collection of every international government event pertaining to technology ever held, which is
well beyond the scope and resources of this research. For this research, a loose form cooperative
activity was included if the present government representatives had the authority and intention to
make new commitments or progress directly on behalf of their government. For example, while
the U.S.-Germany Cyber Bilateral Meetings consistently affirm commitments, the SinoEuropean Cyber Dialogues tend to only be focused on a continued discussion that doesn’t share
this intention and produces no such results. This distinction is sufficient for most cooperative
activities, yet it benefits from clarification regarding research activities. A report pertaining to
cybersecurity doesn’t in itself qualify for entry into ICCD. For research activities to count,
governments had to agree to conduct such research in order to make some form of tangible
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progress or commitment from governments. For example, the ITU’s research in 2010 on
definitions and terminology was intended to secure much needed universal terminologies that
governments could agree upon and work from. Therefore, this has been included in ICCD. On
the other hand, the special topic reports that the ITU puts out throughout the course of its regular
operations, while inherently international due to the organization, are not included if they make
no direct effort at attaining progress or commitments where they had been previously lacking.
Additionally, defining a scope requires making decisions as to what challenges pertain to
‘cybersecurity’, a process that inherently involves excluding certain topics. Notably, anything
relating to the topic of privacy was not included in this dataset. While privacy defines laws for
what people and organizations are permitted to keep secret or share within the bounds of the law,
security deals with mitigating and managing activities that breach laws and in many instances
access secret information. This means that numerous agreements such as the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), the US Clarifying Legal Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act,
and the ECOWAS Supplementary Personal Data Protection Act are not included in this dataset.
This is a clear opportunity for future research.

Definitional Challenges
When constructing ICCD, there were two possible methods for flagging entries for typologies.
One method was to review each potential source to properly enter it into the dataset based on the
qualitative features the source possessed. The other was to strictly search for the use of specific
language. Given the acute definitional barriers this field still experiences, as well as possible
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translation issues, a qualitative review of each source was picked as the method for flagging
entries for typologies.
Additionally, while this method provides a more accurate representation than alternatives, it also
relies heavily on context. This requires making a best effort at distinguishing ‘capacity building’
in a cybersecurity context versus a development and connectivity context. Other challenging
instances of this can be found in statements which cover many topics, including topics such as
cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and research. All of these items have different meanings inside,
and outside, the context of cybersecurity. This was often very challenging. Many UN documents
like to include the following phrase in their opening sections: “Considering that it is necessary to
prevent the use of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes”.
Some organizations start an international agreement with an exhaustive list of that forum’s
previous agreements, even if the listed items are more or less unrelated to the focus of the present
agreement. These references were not considered for ICCD as these lists are so commonplace
that they would dilute ICCD significantly.

Biases
Inaccessible Information
Most challenging to this research is the difficulty in finding the ICCD data. Governments often
do a poor job releasing information about their cooperative activity over cybersecurity. There are
many instances when there was sufficient information about a third meeting or agreement, but
finding the prior instances was highly difficult or impossible. Coupling this is the possibility that
many governments may not want their exact efforts fully disclosed for what they deem as
35

security reasons. There are likely instances of close cooperation between staunch allies that are
not available to the public. This lack of information could bias data away from more serious
military and intelligence cooperation being well represented in ICCD.
Language Barrier
These cooperative activities are sourced from a variety of languages. While Google translate is
able to assist with plain text information that is found in a different language, this barrier still
prevents searching for these activities in countries’ official languages or in documents that were
only scanned and put online. For the purposes of the ICCD, agreements in English were
included.
Missing Bilateral Data
At times data was unavailable, especially in agreements that were reached in 2017 or in recent
years. This means that an analysis of all of the polity scores for the entirety of the bilateral data
will be less than the total quantity of agreements. As with any quantitative study, more data
would be preferable and improve the accuracy of this study’s results. In the future, it would be
appropriate for researchers to replicate these methods, given new additional data, to see if the
same conclusions are still reached.
Unequal Country Representation
There is no way around it, some countries are just more active in pursuing cybersecurity
agreements. China and the United States are obvious examples of this. While this does affect the
data, it doesn’t degrade its utility. The matter of fact is that some governments have unequal
clout and interest in cyberspace, and until this changes, these findings drawn from ICCD will
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continue to be valuable. Additionally, the sheer quantity of agreements included in ICCD and its
attempt at being fully inclusive tries to mitigate the risk of over-representation of certain
countries in the data.
Quantity Versus Quality
This research focuses on leveraging ICCD to facilitate a quantitative analysis because it is the
first time a quantitative approach has been possible for the topic of international cybersecurity
agreements. With that in mind, readers should practice a healthy skepticism that quantity doesn’t
determine the quality or efficacy of the included agreements. This research never asserts that one
agreement is necessarily better or more effective than another. However, the quantity of
agreements does provide insights, such as suggesting where governments are placing their
priorities, or where agreements have been easier to achieve. In a domain where governments are
struggling to enforce a basic set of norms and sets of acceptable behavior, quantity and repetition
of agreements is valuable information.

Analysis Tools Used
Using ICCD, RStudio was used to facilitate a series of analysis. These analyses have been sorted
below alphabetically by the tools used to achieve them, followed by a purpose and explanation.


ANOVA - An ‘analysis of variance’ (ANOVA) test confirms that the means of multiple
categorized groups of numbers are in fact statistically significantly different from each other.
In this instance an ANOVA test would communicate if the chosen typologies are statistically
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different from another, or if there’s a chance that they are possibly [mathematically] the
same.


Average Polity And Range- Any bilateral agreement has two polity scores, one from each
government involved, combining these gives an average polity. Over the aggregate of all of
the bilateral agreements, especially once sorted by typology, this provides useful insights,
along with the range.



Average Internet Penetration Rate and Range - Any bilateral agreement has two internet
penetration rate (IPR) scores, one from each government involved, combining these gives an
average IPR. Over the aggregate of all of the bilateral agreements, especially once sorted by
typology, this provides useful insights, along with the range.



Average Tech Capacity And Range - Any bilateral agreement has two high technology export
percentages, one from each government involved, combining these gives an average high
technology export. Over the aggregate of all of the bilateral agreements, especially once
sorted by typology, this provides useful insights, along with the range.



count - A simple count of the number of agreements that pertain to each typology. This can
reveal which agreements are most popular or easiest to achieve. Also, sorting quantities by
organizations in multilateral/multistakeholder data offers insights into each organization.
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CHAPTER 5: HYPOTHESES
As a final step before exploring patterns in existing agreements and areas that are lacking, it’s
useful to lay out what we might reasonably expect to see in our results. These expectations are
presented as a series of hypothesis. This study’s focus is not restricted to these hypothesis, yet it
is still important to compare the results against expected results.

H1 - Discussion and dialogue agreements are the most common.
Due to the fact that mere discussion is the lowest form of commitment, it’s easy to
understand why this would be expected to be the most popular form of agreement in both
bilateral and multilateral/multistakeholder settings.
H2 - Different forums are preferred for different typologies of agreements.
It’s commonly accepted knowledge that different governments look towards different
forums to reach their cybersecurity objectives. This is seen in Russia’s and China’s
repeated attempts to use the UN, but it is also shown inversely, like when the G8 was
used to establish a network of contact points. This agreement was presumably because
this network was acutely needed to keep incidents or misunderstandings from spiraling
up the escalation ladder, a result no one wanted.
H3 - Activity limiting agreements are more common among disparate governments.
It seems that cyberspace favors authoritarian regimes that leverage it against their less
nimble democratic peers. For this reason, it makes sense that activity limiting agreements
take place mainly between dissimilar governments. The exception to this is when like39

minded governments create agreements in the spirit of norm building. However, it is
expected that it is more common for governments to reach these agreements with the
intent of addressing a practical problem instead of just doing so in a norm building way.
H4 - Countries with lower IPRs are less likely to pursue international cybersecurity
agreements.
The idea here is that these agreements aren’t a foreign policy priority for countries that
have less Internet infrastructure. Countries with less infrastructure are less likely to seek
agreements because the Internet isn’t as important to them.
H5 - Incident response agreements are common across different governments just as
cooperation between CERTs is.
Much of the language involved in international agreements frames incident response
agreements as an easy way to find mutual ground. It’s well known that the majority of
threats online come from criminals and other more baseline threats that aren’t state
actors, hence doing things like increasing coordination between CERTs is a win-win for
everyone involved. Due to their agreeableness, these can be expected to be fairly
common.
H6 - Confidence building measures span widely across polity cores and geographies.
Traditional CBMs have a history of bringing together democratic and authoritarian
governments to contribute towards a greater peace. Not only are CBMs expected to span
a variety of different activities, but they will span geographies due to the distance
between some of the world’s leading competitive nations.
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CHAPTER 6: IDENTIFYING PATTERNS IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS
While ICCD allows for an abundance of summary statistics and analyses, some in particular are
deserving of attention. In this section I’ll engage each hypothesis as a backboard for a broader
discussion of the most important patterns and anomalies that ICCD has brought to light.
Quantity most definitely doesn’t speak to any measure of quality, however it does signal which
typologies are easiest to agree on and suggests the priorities of different governments. To begin,
an easy pattern to look for is which kinds of agreements are most abundant. This brings us to our
first hypothesis:
H1 - Discussion and dialogue agreements are the most common.
Status: Not False
Discussion and Dialogue is clearly the most sought out agreement in bilateral and
multilateral/multistakeholder settings. In fact, 79% of all bilateral agreements make some formal

Table 1 – Number and Percentage Representation Out of Total of Each Typology (Bilateral)
commitment to pursue further discussion, an abundance that soars above all other typologies.
However that begs a more rudimentary question - are these typologies even statistically distinct
from each other? An ANOVA test proves that the answer is a resounding no, with an F-Value of
1.527 and a Pr(>F)-Value of 0.144. Yet, while that might be a matter of concern in most
experiments, in this context that may actually be a good thing. The fact that these typologies
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cannot be determined to be fully distinct from one another speaks to just how often one
agreement addresses multiple typologies, signaling that governments are more often than not
open to pursuing multiple objectives simultaneously in a bilateral setting. But in what
combinations?

Table 2 – Number of Instances When Agreements of Different Typologies Accompany Each
Other (Bilateral)
Discussion and dialogue is apparently often bundled with other types of agreements and is the
overlapping factor here. When that typology is removed from the ANOVA test, statistical
significance between the categories improves noticeably with an F-Value of 0.849 and a Pr(>F)Value of 0.547. However, excluding discussion and dialogue would be a mistake as its
prevalence suggests there is some driving cause as to why it’s common with other agreements.
One possible reason might be that the typology is fundamentally different from the others.
Whereas every other typology covers a subject matter, discussion and dialogue is an activity.
This is not necessarily bad, and it’s clearly a prominent enough item in agreements to warrant
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being its own typology, but it does mean that in comparison to the other typologies there’s an
‘apples and oranges’ scenario.
At first glance discussion and dialogue is most commonly observed along with capacity building,
cybercrime, and confidence building measure bilateral agreements. However, it remains unclear
if this is because it substantively has a reason to be present with these other typologies, or if this
is only because these other three typologies are the other most common typologies. With the
exception of the defense typology (at 14%), discussion and dialogue is consistently present with
16% to 22% of every bilateral typology. Most likely there is another underlying reason why
discussion and dialogue is present in roughly one fifth of every typology.
To investigate this further I compared these bilateral findings to their
multilateral/multistakeholder counterparts. Immediately a comparison of the ANOVA tests show
that the results are very different. The multilateral/multistakholder typology ANOVA test is
highly statistically distinct with an F-Value of 10.8 and a Pr(>F)-Value of 4.6e-15, meaning that
the amount of overlap we had previously witnessed in bilateral instances is not seen in the
multilateral/multistakeholder data at all. Although, interestingly we do see that there is still
roughly one fifth of all typologies being present along with the discussion and dialogue typology
(except activity limiting at 13%). Similarly, the multilateral/multistakeholder data also has
cybercrime, capacity building, and confidence building measures as the next most abundant
agreements and they’re also most often paired with discussion and dialogue.
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Table 3 – Number of Instances When Agreements of Different Typologies Accompany Each
Other (Multi)
There’s no clear answer to this one fifth phenomena. While this would need to demonstrated in
further research to discover a causal mechanism, these results suggest that discussion and
dialogue agreements are fruitful roughly one fifth of the time, with little regard as to the
typologies or governments involved. The presence of a discussion and dialogue agreement is
evidence that these bundled results happen in a forum where it’s not a given that discussion on
cybersecurity will happen on an ongoing basis without an agreement, so possibly these bundled
results speak more about the forums they come out of than the efforts that create them. No matter
the reasons, it seems one fifth of discussion and dialogue agreements result in another type of
agreement as well. Of course no one should adopt this statistic as a hard rule, but it does illustrate
an optimistic picture of diplomatic efforts. The consequences of such a finding are that if policy
makers commit themselves to putting their heads together and hashing things out, there is a
proven history of reaching further agreements, and this may be a useful tactic moving forward.
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Also insightful is the fact that the multilateral/multistakeholder data in ICCD is highly
statistically significant while the bilateral data isn’t statistically significant at all. This
demonstrates that there is a heavy overlap of typologies in the bilateral data while there is much
less in the multilateral/multistakeholder data. Practically speaking, it would seem that bilateral
approaches are more suitable for addressing multiple topics of agreement simultaneously, while
agreements that involve more governments tend to be more precise and focus more on one
component. This makes sense, but what typologies are addressed through which organizations?
This leads to the next hypothesis:
H2 - Different forums are preferred for different typologies of agreements.
Status: Not False
As the previous ANOVA test hints at, different typologies are addressed individually in
multilateral/multistakeholder settings, and they are often addressed through different forums. The
quantity of international agreements should definitely be taken with a grain of salt as different
organizations move at different paces and vary in how often they produce tangible agreements.
So if one organization has one more agreement than another, that doesn’t communicate anything
useful. However, viewing the quantities more broadly and the quantities as rough
generalizations, we can clearly identify a few trends.
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Table 4 – Organizations With The Highest Number of Agreements of Each Typology (multi) (‘TIE’ used when multiple entries have same quantity)

One pattern is when the United Nations is used. The UN has been successful in serving as a
forum for discussion and dialogue and research pertaining to how different members view
cybersecurity issues. This is reflected in the annual recurrence of agreements to discuss and look
further into the matter that went on for nearly twenty years starting in 1998. Additionally,
governments seem to feel comfortable denouncing terrorism through the UN, and agreeing on
how to combat terrorists’ use of communications technologies. This ability to agree is most
likely rooted in how loosely defined the term terrorism is. While the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization includes the idea of ‘information terrorism’, this is not present in other
organizations’ agreements. The two UN activity limiting agreements come from the UN GGE
documents. These were difficult to negotiate and represent progress in themselves. However in
comparison to other forums, the UN doesn’t seem to be a preferred forum for activity limiting
agreements.
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The G8/G7 and G20 are the only other forums that have been used for
multilateral/multistakeholder activity limiting agreements, which is a markedly different
approach than going through the UN. These instances suggest that world leaders understand that
their most important activity limiting commitments will be from other world leaders and
competing governments. Possibly these leader felt that if they could solidify certain activity
limiting agreements with other world leaders, they could build a coalition to enforce these norms
in cyberspace.
By far, regional forums seem to dominate many of these multilateral/multistakeholder
agreements. The EU and ASEAN both have a strong presence in most typologies, although
ASEAN seems to shy away from some of the typologies that require a strong political
commitment like Defense. Europe’s solidarity through NATO is apparent as they seem to be the
only organization willing to take on firm defense commitments. The Organization of American
States seems to have a judicial focus as it is present in discussion and dialogue, cybercrime, and
terrorism. A look at the Organization of American States documents reveals that the organization
has found a niche for facilitating judicial cooperation in the Americas in the absence of any
equivalent premier agreement like Europe’s Budapest Convention6, although some Western
Hemisphere countries have signed that as well. These findings seem to align and confirm with
how experts view these organizations being utilized. What still remains unexplored is how
governments’ efforts are manifesting in bilateral agreements.

6

Better known as the European Commission’s ‘Convention on Cybercrime’
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H3 - Activity limiting agreements are more common among disparate governments.
Status: Not False
Activity limiting agreements are sort of the ‘odd one out’ within this field of study, especially the
bilateral agreements. While many of the other agreement typologies involve governments finding
common ground and trying to build on that for further progress, activity limiting agreements
aren’t always as good hearted. Some of them are anticipatory and out of good will, but many of
them tend to be reactive after a buildup of tensions. For example, many of the bilateral activity
limiting agreements involving the Chinese government could more appropriately be described as
a having been stop-gap measures for near diplomatic crises. For the purposes of this study those
instances would still be considered a priority to the Chinese government though, if at the very
least the priority was calming down infuriated peer governments. This typology would benefit
from a more nuanced approach that aims to keep this anticipatory versus reactive context in
mind, but considering it is already a slimly populated typology, doing so in this study would only
hinder the resulting findings. Plus, activity limiting doesn’t always take place in such a hostile
environment. There are instances when governments have agreed not to attack CERTs without
any looming diplomatic crisis. These circumstances in no way disqualify the typology from this
research, but they do offer an important context.
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Table 5 – Distribution of Average Polity Scores of Governments Participating In Agreements Per
Typology (Bilateral)

Figure 1 – Distribution of The Polity Scores of Every Government For Each Agreements Sorted
By Typology (Bilateral)
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The distribution of polity scores within activity limiting sticks out from other typologies.
Activity limiting and terrorism skew much more heavily towards authoritarian participants than
most other typologies. Along with these low polity means, cybercrime also has a comparatively
low mean, demonstrating that these are higher priorities for authoritarian governments. All of
these categories focus on the rights and legal powers of a given government and reinforce the
common viewpoint that lower polity countries tend to worry about domestic instability. Equally
revealing are where the highest polity means exist, which speak to what more democratic
governments pursue.
Compared to authoritarian priorities, high polity governments are more involved with bilateral
agreements over incident response and defending themselves. The mean average polity of
agreements in the defense typology is the second highest of all the typologies. It also has one of
the highest minimum values in its range out of the entirety of ICCD, meaning that the low point
of its polity range is higher.
Looking beyond the average polities, viewing the distribution of high polity scores before they
are averaged with their respective low polity scores reveals a more nuanced finding. The
averages suggest incident response and defending themselves are the highest priorities of liberal
democracies, but the averaged numbers are affected by the outlying authoritarian governments.
The un-averaged scores show that democracies are also heavily engaged in confidence building
measures, capacity building, and discussion and dialogue. It’s good to see that these typologies
have a heavy enough engagement with authoritarian governments to skew their average results,
especially when it comes to discussion and dialogue and confidence building measures.
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The difference between the average results and the un-averaged polity scores makes it clear that
even though these typologies might not be liberal democracies’ high foreign policy priorities, it
is still more so a priority for them than their authoritarian counterparts. The discussion and
dialogue typology has the most authoritarian participants out of every typology, yet because of
the heavy representation of liberal democracies, its statistics are still heavily skewed upwards.
The fact that discussion and dialogue is an activity and not a subject matter most likely explains
why it is so easily dominated by democratic participation who might value dialogue and
openness more highly, but the same can’t be said for capacity building or confidence building
measures (CMBs).
Most likely the skew with the confidence building measures typology is based in definitional
challenges. Where this study might classify information sharing between two friendly
governments as a CBM, the context of their relationship might mean that such an agreement
possibly leans more towards a defense or [non existent in this study] intelligence agreement.
Quantitative findings from the CBM typology seem to have suffered from the open definition
used in the process of constructing ICCD. Future research may look to more appropriately sort
that category.
The upwards skew of the capacity building typology has no such excuse. If anything, a more
open definition that might include development efforts would shift it downwards, and this is not
the case. Even including an above average number of negative polity scores, the typology still
skews dramatically towards the top. Capacity building is not only a priority of liberal
democracies – it happens most often exclusively between liberal democracies, just like the
incident response typology.
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From a practical standpoint these varied priorities between democracies and authoritarian
governments prove very tough for policy makers. Many liberal democracies are convinced of the
efficacy of multistakeholder institutions, but it would appear that not only do opponents of this
idea disagree with this assertion, but it actually runs against the grain of their highest foreign
policy priorities. Additionally, liberal democracies seem focused on forging agreements among
themselves, which runs counter to how governments usually approach transnational issues.
H4 - Countries with lower IPRs are less likely to pursue international cybersecurity
agreements.
Status: False
While ‘lower’ is a subjective term without a defined threshold, this statement still rings untrue.
Every bilateral entry in ICCD has two IPR values, one from the higher country, and one from the
llower, after a quick look of the distribution of ‘high’ and ‘low’ IPR pairs, the majority of IPRs
volved in these agreements falls below 80%. Rising powers like China and India are active in
seeking out these agreements, therefore to claim that lower IPR countries don’t pursue these
agreements would be excluding some of the world’s most important players in cyberspace.
Interestingly though, there is a gap roughly between the 50% to 60% IPR range. Possibly there is
some sort of threshold here. I already explored the differences between authoritarian and
democratic governments, and this IPR gap could be related.
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It’s not surprising that lower IPR countries participate along with higher IPR countries,
especially since we already know that an IPR doesn’t necessarily speak to a government’s
offensive capabilities.

Figure 2 – Distribution of Low/High IPRs From Each Bilateral Agreements With IPR Data
Available
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Table 6 – Distribution of Internet Penetration Rates of Countries Participating In Agreements Per
Typology (Bilateral)

Figure 3 – Distribution of Internet Penetration Rates of Countries Participating In Agreements
Per Typology (Bilateral)
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Yet there is much more here to be discovered beyond simple trends with the IPRs. By laying out
the IPRs, high tech exports, and polity scores of each typology, the data becomes much more
revealing. ICCD already revealed the difference in priorities between democratic and
authoritarian governments. Relating those insights with these findings offers further
understanding. It turns out that the terrorism, activity limiting, and cybercrime typologies have
the three lowest IPRs as well. So while IPR is no predictor of government participation in
international cybersecurity agreements, lower IPRs do generally tend to occur among more
authoritarian governments.

Table 7 – Distribution of High Technology Export Percentages of Countries
Participating In Agreements Per Typology (Bilateral)
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Figure 4 – Distribution of High Technology Export Percentages of Countries
Participating In Agreements Per Typology (Bilateral)

Sorting agreement typologies by the high technology exports of the governments who
participated in them outlines two different groups. The terrorism and activity limiting typologies
have very high means, while the cybercrime typology has the lowest. Considering this in the
context of the 50% to 60% IPR gap of the bilateral agreements (Figure 1.1), there may be a
tangible threshold distinguishing these two authoritarian groups from one another. This
possibility that IPRs and polity scores are related should be an area of focus for future research.
These findings suggest that there are two categories of authoritarian governments with distinct
foreign policy priorities in cyberspace, those that are highly technically capable and those that
are not.

56

The correlation of activity limiting agreements with high technology export statistics suggests
that high technology exports possibly correlate with whichever metrics governments use to
identify possible threats. It may be possible for democratic countries to proactively spot
authoritarian governments that will become aggressive in cyberspace by using a process that at
least in some way involves tracking their high technology exports. Then they may be able to
proactively enter activity limiting agreements before these impending aggressive governments
grow into their full potential. Inversely, authoritarian governments that have issues with
aggressive democracies will be seen as a greater threat and have more diplomatic leverage once
they gain further technical expertise and their economy matures to show this.
If researchers were able to prove any sort of causation between IPRs, polity scores, and high tech
exports, democracies may gain additional development and foreign policy tools to achieve
democracy and human rights promotion. This finding is also useful in that it is now clear that
authoritarian governments with relatively lower high technology exports are most likely
interested in pursuing agreements over cybercrime. Democracies could offer these less capable
authoritarian governments basic cybercrime cooperation in exchange for achieving some of their
own foreign policy objectives.
H5 and H6 are discussed in the following section.
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Recapping Patterns


Discussion and dialogue agreements are not only the most common, they tend to
accompany agreements in additional typologies roughly one fifth of the time. This should
not be considered a hard rule, but does suggest a reason to stay optimistic about
diplomatic efforts.



Bilateral agreements are much better suited for addressing multiple topics to agree on
simultaneously, while agreements involving more than two governments are usually
narrowly focused.



The United Nations is good for facilitating dialogue, researching various viewpoints, and
counter terrorism activities, although terrorism in cyberspace is loosely defined.



Regional agreements are very prominent forums for pursuing international cybersecurity
agreements.



Authoritarian regimes focus on projecting or managing state power and maintaining
control through the terrorism, cybercrime, and activity limiting typologies.



Democracies maintain a defensive focus through the capacity building, defense, and
incident response typologies.



Authoritarian governments are divided into two groups, one with high technical
capability, and one without. Those with high technical capabilities participate in the
activity limiting and terrorism typology more while those without prioritize cybercrime
agreements.
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CHAPTER 7: IDENTIFYING AREAS OF COOPERATION THAT ARE LACKING
Just as important as identifying trends is reading between the lines and understanding what’s not
taking place. Forging international agreements over cybersecurity is daunting work, yet there is a
lot of room for improvement that has gone unnoticed. In order to move past our current state of
occasional flare ups and crises, we need to identify and follow a more proactive approach by
finding more common ground and forging more agreements.

Incident Response and Capacity Building Agreements
An easy place for governments to start doing this is within the incident response typology.
H5 - Incident response agreements are common across different governments just as cooperation
between CERTs is.
Status: False
Not only are agreements over incident response and capacity building among those less
commonly pursued, these typologies lack any significant agreements that move the ball forward.
Bilateral incident response agreements are most often pursued between democratic governments,
similar to defense agreements, and capacity building agreements are nearly this exclusive as
well. Additionally, the majority of these multilateral/multistakeholder agreements that do exist
tend to be regional.
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There are several possible explanations for the current lack of incident response and capacity
building agreements. The lack of incident response agreements might be that cooperation
between CERTs already fills this void to an extent, but that argument doesn’t hold up very well.
CERTs do have a crucial role to play in national and international cybersecurity, but their
mandates only go so far. Whereas CERTs can exchange information such as how to recognize
different new strains of malware on a machine and coordinate incident responses, they don’t
have the authority to place bigger requests at an international level. CERT’s mandates fall short
when a situation goes beyond purely technical topics. If there were ever a ruinous operation
against an international impactful target like a major international bank, concerns such as
monetary costs of damage as well as digital records disparities (to name a few) would be outside
of the mandate of CERTs, but also too burdensome for existing mutual legal assistance
agreements to address amply.
Governments are most likely aware of this. Just the fact that incident response agreements
beyond CERT cooperation exist is enough to demonstrate that governments clearly see some
value in them beyond what CERTs can provide. Plus, agreements and activities usually have to
be repeated over and over to create a norm, so multiple efforts would be expected for this
typology as well. Another possibility may be that governments are simply approaching their
close allies in establishing international agreements over cybersecurity before branching out
further. This is more likely, but it still doesn’t answer why other typologies have readily reached
across polity ranges. Cybercrime should be a more politically contentious topic than incident
response and capacity building, yet the cybercrime typology seems to have seen much more
progress.
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While there’s room for multiple interpretations of why the incident response and capacity
building typologies have such slim polity statistics, what seems to fit the given results best is that
governments simply view cybersecurity in terms of relative advantages instead of absolute
advantages. Governments viewing cybersecurity in terms of relative advantages explains why
they would be willing to coordinate over judicial matters, but not over more technical leaning
cybersecurity topics like cooperating over better protecting critical infrastructure and setting up
agreements for assistance in case of an emergency. Governments may feel more comfortable
knowing that other governments are generally more vulnerable. This is really unfortunate, but
it’s also an opportunity for future cooperation. The majority of cybersecurity threats are nonaffiliated criminals. Governments would not be sacrificing their place within the competitive
realm of cybersecurity by establishing agreements that commit emergency assistance and help
coordinate preparedness efforts. Likewise, governments are quick to call cybersecurity a
transnational issue. If they truly believe this, they should be eager to establish agreements
cooperating over securing critical infrastructure that criminals can easily target and agreements
over ensuring a basic level of competency for practitioners..
Probably, governments aren’t necessarily opposed to more encompassing incident response and
capacity building agreements, but they are preoccupied with other topics they prioritize higher.
There are nearly as many bilateral activity limiting agreements as there are incident response
agreements, and considering that those should be significantly harder to agree upon, that
shouldn’t be the case. It implies that governments are acutely worried about other governments,
as opposed to more common and likely criminal threats.
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At the moment, the incident response clause with the most clout out of any relevant agreement
comes from the UN GGE 2015 Report, it reads:
“States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical
infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to appropriate
requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another
State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.”
While this is a start, two sentences is nowhere near as comprehensive an agreement as could
most likely be attained. Similarly encompassing agreements over capacity building are even less
established, with most capacity building happening in forums and conferences that free
governments of any official commitments or benchmarks. Compare this to another typology,
cybercrime. The Budapest Convention on cybercrime goes on for over twenty pages specifically
listing how to facilitate cooperation. There’s no good reason why an equivalently prolific
capacity building or incident response agreement can’t be established. This is even more so
important with the incident response typology as its very nature implies a major disruption or
emergency has taken place, which is the exact moment when a predefined plan is most valuable.

Confidence Building Measure Agreements
Although the quantitative results for the confidence building measures (CBM) typology suffered
from a broad definition, this typology is concerning from a qualitative standpoint. Most
commonly we see forms of information sharing and establishing points of contact for resolving
issues. These agreements should be encouraged, but they are not enough. The debate among
policy makers now seems to be how to best make forward progress.
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The predominant method right now involves voluntary norms and defining acceptable behavior.
This diverges from historical confidence building strategies. Traditional agreements like the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Prevention of Incidents In and Over High Seas Agreement, and the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban all made sure to formally commit parties to specific regulations
through a treaty. The closest that cybersecurity CBMs get to extracting official assurances out of
any given party are the 2015 UN GGE sections on voluntary norms. These are often ignored.
Attempts at laying out additional CBMs, such as the OSCE’s 16 Cyber-CBMs (OSCE, 2016),
are useful thought exercises, but they lack one key component: assigned responsibilities.
Everyone is in favor of supporting norms and CBMs in cyberspace, that is until they’re the ones
being restricted by them.
H6 - Confidence building measures span widely across polity scores and geographies.
Status: False
The fact that multilateral/multistakeholder CBMs are predominantly established regionally is
telling. Considering that this study may be mixing true CBMs with different cooperative
activities between already trusting allies suggests that governments are branching out to their
closest peers to set up these cooperative activities and that in time they’ll expand to do these
activities more globally. Despite this study’s inconclusive CBM quantitative results, through
reading these typologies it’s clear that policy makers should be expanding their CBM playbooks.
Expanding and pushing for new voluntary norms is useful in that it gets competing governments
to agree on certain topics they didn’t agree on or consider before. However, policy makers need
to focus their efforts on committing governments to participate in ongoing CBM activities that
they must sign onto and take some sort of responsibility for. Even if these activities are mirror
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images of regional agreements, that still gets governments used to participating in global CBMs,
which would be useful. These activities could be as mechanical and simple as sharing
information and best practices on a recurring basis through an agreed upon forum. The point is
that there is repetition, and that a specific government officially agrees to participate via some
sort of treaty or formalized document for which it is responsible.

Standards Setting
Much like setting fuel emission standards for vehicles to be sold in a certain country,
governments can agree to force products to be certified as reasonably secure before being
eligible to be sold on the market. Or at the very least they can offer a sort of ‘cyber security
nutrition facts’ system to help non-technically inclined consumers understand what generalized
security features their product includes (Healey, 2018). These types of agreements were nearly
non-existent in ICCD and are not widely adopted at the moment. One reason for this is that
agreements pertaining to market and ecommerce standards tend to fall outside of the scope of
ICCD because they are more often pursued as privacy and consumer rights topics than the
government oriented cybersecurity topics included in ICCD.
The European Commission has already put out a proposal for this type of agreement, although it
is yet to be formalized. (European Commission, 2017) No one else has made progress in this
area. One possible situation would be for governments to make these product standards
agreements open so that others could join. These agreements could also encompass the company
selling the product, ensuring they have the proper incident response and product life-cycle
processes in place to track a product’s security status as it ages and to effectively handle security
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breaches. Understandably, agreements like this might brush up against concerns of market
competitiveness, although there are a number of ways this could be managed. The agreements
could only apply to products and companies that hit certain benchmarks like units sold or
revenues. Governments could even establish a process for empowering already existing private
companies to audit products and companies and distribute certifications appropriately as to avoid
undue costs on their own behalf.
Realistically these agreements seem to be far off. Plus, simply saying it would be helpful to set
standards oversimplifies the whole topic of cybersecurity. What constitutes a secure Cisco switch
[networking device] is a completely different set of standards than what constitutes a secure
banking application.

Defining ‘Cyber Terrorism’
Appending the phrase ‘cyber’ onto old topics is a great way to reinvigorate their importance and
shift the discussion to dealing with how the topic changes due to new technologies, but doing
this also muddies the term’s definition. Unfortunately this has happened a lot. ‘Terrorism’ in
particular has been affected.
Does vandalizing a website so that it shows pro-Islamic State content as opposed to its intended
content qualify as ‘cyber terrorism’ (Barrett, 2017)? If so, it doesn’t seem to be very effective.
Yes, it frustrated law enforcement authorities, but no one seemed intimidated nor did anyone’s
stance on the Islamic State change. Website defacements are commonplace online, so the
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Figure 1.5 – Mr. Bean Website Defacement
conclusion here is that just like traditional definitions of terrorism, there’s a nuanced point to be
made about the intended effect. This is where the real disagreements become more serious.
For example, consider the time someone replaced all of the pictures of the Spanish Prime
Minister with photos of Mr. Bean on the EU’s website (BBC, 2010). That’s clearly not terrorism
in Europe, but what about in other countries? The Shanghai Cooperation Organization uses the
following definition for ‘information terrorism’:
“This threat emanates from terrorism organizations and individuals involved in terrorist
activities acting unlawfully though information resources against/regarding them. It is
characterized by the use of information networks by terrorist organizations to carry out
terrorist activities and recruit new supporters; destructive impact on information resources
leading to disruption of public order; control or blocking of mass media channels, use of the
Internet or other information networks for terrorist propaganda, creating an atmosphere of
fear and panic in the society, as well as other negative impacts on information resources”
(Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009).
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Figure 1.6 – Notoriously Banned Picture of Putin
Does fiddling with an important government website count as controlling or blocking a mass
media channel? Assuming government officials have a healthy sense of humor, probably not.
Does this stunt pose “negative impacts on information resources”? Yes. The point here is that
some concepts have been so loosely defined that they essentially become formal ways for
governments to claim the right to decide on a case-by-case basis. Also, the threshold here isn’t
clear at all. Imagine that this same stunt had taken place in Russia, but instead of using pictures
of Mr. Bean, the perpetrator used the notoriously banned online picture displaying Putin as a
[presumably] homosexual clown. All of the sudden, this comical stunt could very easily be
deemed terrorism, at least while Putin or his sympathizers are still in power.
On top of the fact that ‘cyber terrorism’ online is often fluidly defined by content, there remains
additional areas of confusion. Most governments seem to agree that terrorist forums and
recruitment online constitute cyber terrorism, but this doesn’t translate into the physical world
very well. If five violent extremists hang out in their living room discussing their religious
ideologies in the physical world, while those individuals are regarded as dangerous, that in itself
isn’t defined as terrorism; when they do this online it is. Whereas policy-makers seem to want to
differentiate regular crime from terrorism based on a question of why someone is doing

67

something, in most cases online the only thing differentiating cyber crime from terrorism boils
down to a question of who is doing it.

Recapping Lacking Areas


There is a lack of significant incident response agreements. This is most likely due to
government's viewing cybersecurity as a relative advantage and not an absolute advantage
topic.



There is a lack of confidence building measures between competing governments that require
official commitments, even if those are at the most basic levels.



Agreements specifying mutually agreed cybersecurity standards for products is a novel area
of cooperation and has potential, but is not currently adopted by anyone.



‘Cyber terrorism’ is defined by who is involved, and different countries view these
organizations and individuals very differently.
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CHAPTER 8: KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR POLICY MAKERS
The last two sections present insightful discoveries about international cooperation concerning
cybersecurity. ICCD allows many findings, and many of them remain to be explored. Among
this research, the main takeaways are listed below.

Governments view their cybersecurity posture in terms of relative gains, even though it is
in their best interest to view this topic in terms of absolute gains.
Incident response and capacity building agreements at the bilateral level are predominantly
pursued between democracies and similarly democratic governments. The most compelling
reason for this is that governments view cybersecurity as a competitive activity. Evidence
suggests that they feel more comfortable knowing their possible competitors are vulnerable.
Further, multilateral/multistakeholder incident response and capacity building agreements are
dominated by regional organizations, supporting this point further. This insight is contradictory
to the language many governments currently use in many of their agreements about how
cybersecurity is a transnational issue. Yet, actions speak louder than words, and clearly
governments have been very selective in choosing who to pursue such activities with.

Authoritarian governments are involved with agreements over controlling or projecting
government authority while democratic governments focus on resilience and defense.
Agreements over terrorism, activity limiting, and cybercrime all have a much stronger
representation from authoritarian regimes than other agreements. These categories focus on the
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rights and legal powers of governments and reinforce the common viewpoint that authoritarian
countries tend to worry about domestic instability and challenges to their authority. In contrast,
democracies are more involved with bilateral agreements over incident response, capacity
building, and defending themselves. Not only are there often definitional challenges in
cybersecurity cooperation, but also differing governments seem to have different foreign policy
priorities that they are pursuing. From a practical standpoint this proves very difficult for policy
makers. Many liberal democracies are convinced of the efficacy of multistakeholder institutions,
but it would appear that not only do opponents of this idea disagree with this assertion, but it
actually runs against the grain of their highest foreign policy priorities.

Authoritarian governments are divided in their efforts based on their economies’ technical
capabilities.
Authoritarian governments are subdivided among their economies’ technical capabilities.
Counter-terrorism and activity limiting agreements correlate with countries that have much
larger higher tech exports. Inversely, cybercrime agreements trend with authoritarian
governments whose countries have low amounts of high tech exports. This could be explained in
several ways. It could be that a distinction between ‘terrorism’ as a separate topic from ‘crime’
only occurs at a certain point in a country’s developmental maturity. It could also be that
separately prioritizing terrorism isn’t a priority for governments until they feel they have the
technical capability to do so effectively.
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Discussion and dialogue agreements accompany additional agreements roughly one fifth of
the time.
Nearly every type of agreement is coupled with an agreement over discussion and dialogue
roughly one fifth of the time. This preliminarily suggests that discussion and dialogue
agreements have yielded, or at least contributed to, agreements over different topics about a fifth
of the time. Future research should look into a possible causal relationship that may offer policy
makers a direct understanding of when their discussions are most fruitful and yield results.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
Viewing international cybersecurity challenges through a ‘cooperative approach’, as opposed to
a conflict-centric lens may offer valuable insights. ICCD has proved a powerful tool for policy
research. It offers researchers a central location for all of the world’s publicly available
agreements over cybersecurity up until 2018. Using ICCD I was able to identify multiple
patterns in the vast quantity of current agreements while also pointing out some areas that are
lacking.
Through this method I’ve documented how authoritarian regimes work to project state power in
cyberspace and how democracies maintain a defense and resilience oriented approach in
cyberspace. Yet this study has only scratched the surface of the insights ICCD offers. Future
work can focus on applying a more nuanced approach to troublesome typologies like confidence
building measures and activity limiting. Also, future research can look to find relationships
between the additional variables, the agreements within ICCD, and the dates they were
established. ICCD will save researchers significant amounts of time and allow them to hone in
on their primary research focuses within the topic of international cybersecurity cooperation.
Additionally, ICCD has quantified one of the most tangible measures of international
cooperation over cybersecurity, this means that it may now be possible to compare conflict and
cooperation data as it pertains to cybersecurity specifically.
Hopefully this research, and ICCD in its current form, are a start and not an end. As more
governments gain offensive capabilities and the political stakes in cyberspace increase, working
towards agreements on these topics is needed now more than ever. The time for policy makers to
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prioritize these challenges and improve their cooperation is now, as it will only get harder as
time goes on and the foreign policy surrounding cybersecurity becomes even more complicated.
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